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Abstract Currently, many socially responsible govern-
ments adopt economic incentives and deterrents to manage
environmental impacts of electricity suppliers. Considering
the Stackelberg leadership of the government, the gov-
ernment’s role in the competition of power plants in an
electricity market is investigated. A one-population evo-
lutionary game model of power plants is developed to
study how their production strategy depends on tariffs
levied by the government. We establish that a unique
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) for the population exists.
Numerical examples demonstrate that revenue maximiza-
tion and environment protection policies of the government
significantly affect the production ESS of competitive
power plants. The results reveal that the government can
introduce a green energy source as an ESS of the com-
petitive power plants by imposing appropriate tariffs.
Keywords Evolutionary game theory  Green electricity 
Power plant  Government intervention  Energy source
selection
Introduction
The evolutionary game theory (Smith and Price 1973)
naturally applies to biology; however, it can be adopted to
explain and predict many phenomena in economics, busi-
ness, and other issues in social and political areas. In
interactions among players, evolutionary game suggests
that the better strategies would finally evolve and dominate
among the players (Barron 2013). For the first time, this
paper proposes evolutionary game theory for evaluation of
green and non-green production strategies of power plant’s
population. The evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) for
power plants is a good strategy that results in a stable sit-
uation for the population. Moreover, we will study how the
ESS may be affected from the government financial
intervention.
The power plants as the largest polluting industry have
encouraged a lot of scientific researches. To promote the
green electricity, the government should take effective
actions to compensate for extra production costs of the
renewable (green) energy and impose penalties for the
nonrenewable energies. For example, the pollution tax
levied on carbon dioxide emission is a powerful policy
mechanism that can address market failures in energy
industry (Wu et al. 2006). The role of the government’s
green policies in the polluting industries is considered in
several studies. By constructing a theoretical game model
with incomplete information, Cerqueti and Coppier (2014)
discussed the effects of interaction between polluting firms,
tax inspectors, and government politicians on environ-
mental policy. Dong et al. (2010) presented a framework
for analyzing the conflicts between a local government and
a potentially pollution producer using the game theory.
They investigated the effects of environmental subsidy and
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Liu et al. (2007) studied quantity and price competitions of
two power plants. Hafezalkotob (2015) modeled the com-
petition of two green and regular supply chains under
different government policies. They considered three
strategies for government including environmental protec-
tion, revenue seeking, weighted sum model of environ-
mental protection and revenue-seeking policies. The
equilibrium prices of each supply chain under government
intervention have been obtained. Huang et al. (2016)
applied game theory to study the impacts of product line
design, supplier selection, transportation mode selection
and pricing strategies on profits and greenhouse gases
emissions in a green supply chain with multiple suppliers, a
single manufacturer and multiple retailers. Guo et al.
(2016) analyzed a supply chain system that consists of
supplier, manufacturer, and government, and then investi-
gates the effects of government subsidies on social welfare
and the profits of supply chain members. Their results
showed that a government’s green tariffs depends on the
sensitivity of consumers to prices. Under government
financial intervention, Hafezalkotob (2017) developed
price-energy-saving competition and cooperation models
for two green supply chains. Their results showed that the
government can lead the green supply chains to achieve the
sustainability objectives by an appropriate tariff mecha-
nism. Considering the government’s role in the competition
of two power plants, Mahmoudi et al. (2014) proposed a
Nash bargaining game model to help the government to
determine the taxes and subsidies. Their proposed approach
demonstrated how the government can intervene in a
competitive market of electricity to achieve the environ-
mental objectives.
In the game theory framework, several oligopoly models
have also been proposed to evaluate the strategic behavior
in the electricity markets, including Bertrand, Cournot, and
Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE). For instance, Cournot
equilibria in oligopolistic electricity markets have been
studied by Vespucci et al. (2009). By assuming a linear
demand curve, they presented a model that describes the
strategic interactions of firms based on this assumption that
the generation firms are Cournot oligopolists. Li et al.
(2004) used the SFE model to evaluate the power sup-
plier’s bidding behavior. They modeled the market power
of an independent system operator (ISO) as a bi-level
multi-objective problem. Hinz (2006) obtained the equi-
librium strategies in random-demand procurement auctions
in the electricity market and presented a method for
explicit calculation of the bid strategies.
A review on the previous studies indicates that the
proposed approach of this research covers two new features
in comparison with the other existing models. First, the
government is regarded as the leading player who inter-
venes in the competitive electricity market. Although the
governmental economic incentives such as promoting and
preventing policies for the environmental protection pur-
poses have been investigated in some particular industries
(Dobbs 1991; Dinan 1993; Ulph 1996; Fullerton and Wu
1998; Walls and Palmer 2001), the incentives have been
rarely studied in the electricity industry. Second, to the best
of the author’s knowledge, no research was found in the
context of green electricity market that uses the evolu-
tionary game theory to model the energy source choosing
strategy of the power plants.
This paper especially investigates the government’s role
as the Stackelberg leader in the strategies of the power
plants as the Stackelberg followers. A bi-level program-
ming model is proposed for the hierarchical decision-
making framework. The main objective of this study is to
evaluate the evolutionary production strategies of the
power plants regarding the governmental financial inter-
ventions to fulfill the environmental protection purposes.
This paper particularly uses the mathematical game
theory model to address the following research questions:
1. Using financial instruments such as tax and subsidy,
how can a government intervene in competition of the
power plants such that green purposes can be
achieved?
2. Under the governmental interventions, what are the
evolutionary responses of the competitive power plants
and which strategy is used by the majority of the
plants?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2,
the proposed model and the elements of evolutionary game
theory are presented. The ESS and derived equilibrium
solutions are also introduced in this section. In Sect. 3, a
numerical example is considered. Eventually, the con-
cluding remarks and suggestions for the future research are
given in Sect. 4.
Model formulation
In this paper, many (a sufficiently large number of) inde-
pendent (geographically dispersed) markets are considered.
It is assumed that all the markets are identical and the
individuals in the population randomly compete with each
other in pairs to play a game. In other words, there are
exactly two power plants in every market. All one/two-
population models assume that two individuals in one-shot
game and representative market are copied several times
such that the structures for all one-shot game are the same.
This is a common assumption in the one/two-population
evolutionary game model (Bester and Gu¨th 1998; Xiao and
Chen 2009): each power plant has two options for the type
of its energy source which are called green and non-green
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energy sources. Green energy is the renewable energy
sources that can be solar power, wind power, small-scale
hydroelectric power, tidal power, or biomass power. These
sources mostly do not produce pollutants; hence, they are
called environmentally friendly or green sources. Renew-
able energies are regarded as a key factor in tackling with
global climate changes and energy shortage crisis (Guler
2009). To keep generality of the proposed evolutionary
game model, the model is not limited to a specific energy
source; hence, the terms ‘‘green’’ and ‘‘non-green sources’’
are employed throughout the paper.
Government levies different levels of tariff for the
power plants with respect to their energy sources. The
government is considered as a profit-seeking agent which
monitors pollution of the power plant population as well.
Two scenarios are considered for the government decision
procedures. In the first one, the government has an
environmental protection behavior, i.e., its decisions are
based on the goal of minimizing the pollution by con-
sidering a minimum level for its revenue. In the second
one, the government has a revenue-seeking behavior, that
is, its decisions are based on the goal of maximizing the
revenue by considering a maximum level for the pollu-
tion. On the other hand, each power plant determines the
electricity production strategy to maximize its profit. The
goal of this paper is to find the ESS of the power plant’s
production decisions and to determine the optimal gov-
ernment’s tariff with regard to evolutionary responses of
the power plants.
For lucidity and simplicity, the subscript ‘‘g’’ is used for
the green source and ‘‘ng’’ for the non-green one. More-
over, the indexes i and j indicate the production strategies
of the competitive power plants where i; j 2 g; ngf g. The
parameters and variables used in the model formulae are as
follows:
Parameters
Ci the unit production cost of the power plants when
using the energy source i, Ci [ 0;
Fi the initial setup cost of the power plants when
using the energy source i, Fi [ 0;
gin The emission amount of pollutant gas n from the
power plants using the energy source i, gin [ 0;
win the relative importance of the pollutant gas n that
is produced from the power plant using the energy
source i, win [ 0;
aij the constant market base for the power plant that
employs the energy source i versus the one which
uses the energy source j, aij  0:
LbGNR the lower bound of the Government Net Revenue
(GNR);
UbEls the upper bound of the Environmental Impacts
(EIs) according to the national or international
standards;
R the reservation payoff for the power plants;
bij the demand sensitivity of the power plant to its
own price, bij [ 0;
cij the demand sensitivity of the power plant to its
rival’s price, cij [ 0;
Variables
pij The electricity price of the power plant that uses the
energy source i versus the power plant that employs
the energy source j, (pij [Ci)
ti The tariff imposed by the government on the power
plants using the energy source i (ti is free in sign). If
ti\0, then the government has provided a subsidy for
consumers of this power plants; however, ti [ 0
indicates that the government has imposed a tax on
the electricity
Dij the demand of the power plant which employs the
energy source i 2 g; ngf g, against the power plant
which uses the energy source j 2 g; ngf g
The proposed game theory model is established on the
following assumptions:
Assumption 1 The power plants play a symmetric two-
person benefit matrix (bi-matrix) game, i.e., B ¼ AT. A
and B are the payoff matrixes of the first and second power
plants, respectively. Practically, it means that in a sym-
metric game it does not matter who is the player I and who
is the player II and the players can switch their roles. This
assumption differs from the two-population evolutionary
models (see Weibull 1997 for more information).
Assumption 2 It is assumed that the competitive power
plants follow the government’s financial legislations and
have the capability to produce electricity using two dif-
ferent energy sources. They are able to set up facilities for
generating electricity from the specific sources. When they
install and start up the corresponding power generations
equipment, the production capacity is ample for the market
demand. That is, the production rate of the power plants is
equal to the corresponding demand rate. Moreover, they
have a negligible internal consumption and waste rate.
Assumption 3 The demand function for each power plant
is assumed continuous which takes the following forms:
Dij ¼ aij  bijðpij þ tiÞ þ cijðpji þ tjÞ i; j 2 g; ngf g: ð1Þ
Dij is the demand function for the power plants
employing the energy source i 2 g; ngf g, against the
power plant which uses the energy source j 2 g; ngf g.
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This function is a general linear demand function used in
most of the previous studies (Shy 2003). The parameters bij
and cij denote independent and positive values that indicate
the demand sensitivity to the prices of a power plant and its
rival, respectively. Equation (1) states that the market
demand of each power plant is an increasing function of its
rival price, though a decreasing function of its own price.
Assumption 4 Regarding the leader role of the govern-
ment, the time order of this game is assumed as follows:
Step 1. The government determines tariffs for the elec-
tricity generated from different sources. The
government’s tariffs are unchanged for a long
time.
Step 2. Considering the tariffs, each power plant in each
period adopts pricing strategy for the selected
source.
Backward induction technique is used to investigate this
dynamic game. In this regard, optimal electricity prices and
ESS of the power plants were analyzed given the govern-
ment’s tariffs, then the government’s decisions will be
studied.
Profit function of power plant
The profit function for each power plant is formulated as
follows:
Pij ¼ ðpij  CiÞDij  Fi ¼ ðpij  CiÞðaij  bijðpij þ tiÞ
þ cijðpji þ tjÞÞ  Fi; i; j
2 g; ngf g: ð2Þ
This function shows how the profit of each power plant
depends on the electricity prices as well as the govern-
ment’s tariffs.
Bertrand game
In each iteration of evolutionary game, the two matched
power plants play a one-shot, non-zero sum game which
represents the benchmark game of the population. These
power plants adopt Bertland competition in each market.
According to the Bertland game model (Vives 1985), a
simultaneous-move game is considered where they inde-
pendently choose the electricity prices. Let ðpij; pjiÞPropo-
sition be the prices of the power plants, respectively. 1
presents the Nash equilibrium of prices for the two mat-
ched power plants.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium price for the power plants
under the given government tariffs ðtg; tngÞ is as follows:
pij ¼ Mij þ Ci; ð3Þ
where Mij ¼ ½2bjiaij þ cijaji þ bjicijðtj þ CjÞ þ ðcijcji 
2bjibijÞðti þ CiÞ=ð4bjibij  cijcjiÞ.
Proofs of all Propositions are given in Appendix A.
Proposition 2 Power plant’s demand and profit at the
equilibrium prices for the given government’s tariffs
ðtg; tngÞ are obtained as follows:
Dij ¼ bijMij ¼ bijðhij þ sijti þ vijtjÞ; ð4Þ
Pij ¼ bijM
2
ij  Fi ¼ bijðhij þ sijti þ vijtjÞ2  Fi; ð5Þ
where hij ¼ ½2bjiaij þ cijaji þ bjicijCj þ ðcijcji  2bjibijÞCi=
ð4bjibij  cijcjiÞ, sij ¼ ðcijcji  2bjibijÞ=ð4bjibij  cijcjiÞ and
vij ¼ bjicij=ð4bjibij  cijcjiÞ.
ESS of production decisions of power plants
In comparison with the traditional games, the evolutionary
game theory emphasizes on the dynamics of strategy change
more than the properties of strategy equilibrium. A strategy
is called evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), if it outper-
forms any invading strategy (Riechmann 2001). Nowadays,
the evolutionary game theory is applied to analyze various
gaming behaviors such as behaviors of firms and industries,
biological and dynamical systems, and economic growth.
Especially in the electricity market, Menniti et al. (2008)
suggested the evolutionary game model to obtain near Nash
equilibrium when more than two producers exist. Whenever
there are only two pure strategies used in the population, the
ESS definition is as follows (Barron, 2013):
2.3.1 Definition S is an ESS against S if and only if
either (6) or (7) holds:
UðS; SÞ[UðS; SÞ; 80 S 1; S 6¼ S; ð6Þ
UðS; SÞ ¼ UðS; SÞ ) UðS; SÞ[UðS; SÞ; 8S 6¼ S:
ð7Þ
An important idea of ESS is that eventually, the strate-
gies will be chosen by the players who produce a better-
than-average payoff. Let sj denote the fraction of power
plants in the population who are using the strategy j. If the
strategy j, is an ESS, then the small fraction of individuals
adopting other strategies in the population cannot obtain
higher profit than the one adopting the strategy j. In the
one-population evolutionary game with two actions,
Friedman (1991) and Weibull (1997) showed that a locally
asymptotically stable fixed point of any weak compatible
dynamics is an ESS. Behavior of the power plants can
evolve to an ESS through an imitating successful behavior
following any weak compatible dynamics.
2.3.2. Definition The expected payoff of a player playing
the strategy i = 1, 2, …, n is as follows:




k¼1 ai;ksk ¼ iAp: ð8Þ







A one-population model (please refer to Weibull 1997;
Xiao and Chen 2009; Barron 2013) is assumed, in which
two matched power plants play a symmetric two-person bi-
matrix game in random contest. Then, the payoff (utility)
bi-matrix of the matched power plants is studied regarding
their adopted strategies (Table 1).
From Eqs. (5), it is understood that the payoff matrix of









g;g  Fg; bg;ngM2g;ng  Fg
bng;gM
2
ng;g  Fngbng;ngM2ng;ng  Fng
 
: ð10Þ
Obviously, the bi-matrix of the power plant II is
B ¼ AT (Barron 2013). From (8), it is found that
EðI; pÞ ¼ 1Ap ¼ a11s1 þ a12s2 ¼ ða11  a12Þs1 þ a12;
ð11Þ
EðII; pÞ ¼ 2Ap ¼ a21s1 þ a22s2 ¼ ða21  a22Þs1 þ a22:
ð12Þ
Owning to symmetry of the one-population evolutionary
game, it is found that EðI; pÞ ¼ EðgÞ and EðII; pÞ ¼ EðngÞ.





, it is known that the demand matrix of
the power plant II is DT. Similar to Eqs. (11) and (12),
EðDgÞ and EðDngÞ can be computed as:
EðDgÞ ¼ 1Dp ¼ ðDg;g  Dg;ngÞs1 þ Dg;ng; ð13Þ
EðDngÞ ¼ 2Dp ¼ ðDng;g  Dng;ngÞs1 þ Dng;ng: ð14Þ
It is supposed that the frequencies p ¼ s1; s2; . . .; snð Þ ¼
pðtÞ 2 P can change over time. Changes in the frequencies
over time are described by the following system of dif-
ferential equations (Barron 2013):
dsiðtÞ
dt
¼ siðtÞ½Eði; pðtÞÞ  EðpðtÞ; pðtÞÞ; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n: ð15Þ
A solution that does not change over time will be a
steady-state equilibrium, or stationary solution. When
siðtÞ½Eði; pðtÞÞ  EðpðtÞ; pðtÞÞ ¼ 0, then dsiðtÞ=dt ¼ 0 and
siðtÞ is not changing over time. If there are only two
strategies in the population, it can be simplified down to
one equation sðtÞ using the substitutions s1ðtÞ ¼ sðtÞ;
s2ðtÞ ¼ 1  sðtÞ. Then:
dsðtÞ
dt
¼ sðtÞð1  sðtÞÞðEð1; pÞ  Eð2; pÞÞ; p ¼ ðs; 1  sÞ;
ð16Þ
where 0 sðtÞ 1.
Inserting (11) and (12) into Eq. (16) yields:
dsðtÞ=dt ¼ sðtÞð1  sðtÞÞðða11 þ a22  a12  a21ÞsðtÞ þ a12
 a22Þ:
ð17Þ
For the stationary solution, dsðtÞ=dt ¼ 0 is solved:
sðtÞ ¼ 0; sðtÞ ¼ 1; sðtÞ
¼ ða22  a12Þ=ða11 þ a22  a12  a21Þ: ð18Þ
Inserting sðtÞ in Eqs. (11) and (12) shows that in the
mixed Nash solution, the expected payoff is the same for
each power plant:
EðPÞ ¼ Eð1; pÞ ¼ Eð2; pÞ
¼ ða11a22  a12a21Þ=ða11 þ a22  a12  a21Þ: ð19Þ
Proposition 3 The Eq. (17) can be solved implicitly






The Proposition 3 provides a function of time and
equilibrium tariffs which can illustrate the behavior of
power plants during the time. In other words, the equilib-
rium in the behavior of the power plant and their
evolutionary learning during the time, until they reach a
stable state, can be viewed using this function.
Lemma 1 The two-player symmetric game with the
matrix A ¼ a11 a12
a21 a22
 
; B ¼ AT , is equivalent to the
symmetric game with the matrix A ¼
a11  a a12  b
a21  a a22  b
 
; B ¼ AT, for any a, b, in the sense
that they have the same set of Nash equilibria.
After calculating the Nash equilibrium point (s), the
following Proposition can be employed to investigate the
ESS condition of the obtained point(s).
Table 1 Bi-matrix for two power plants by different energy sources
Power plant II
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Proposition 4 At the two-player symmetric game with the
matrices A ¼ a11 a12
a21 a22
 
; and B ¼ AT, when
ða11  a21Þða22  a12Þ 6¼ 0, the ESS s of the evolutionary
game between power plants is computed by
s ¼
1 if ða11  a21Þ[ 0; ða22  a12Þ\0
a22  a12
































a11 þ a22  a21  a12
0
0 and 1





If ða11  a21Þ[ 0; ða22  a12Þ[ 0, the mixed Nash is
not an ESS, then there are two evolutionary stable strate-
gies, namely s1 ¼ ð1; 0Þ and s2 ¼ ð0; 1Þ. To determine
which one will be eventually chosen by the community of
power plants, the Proposition 3 has to be used. In this case,
the stationary solution of the evolutionary game of the
power plants depends on the initial condition of the power
plants.
Model of government
A government normally aims to take a measure which
optimizes the pollution level and its net revenue. Two
different scenarios are assumed for these objective func-
tions. First, the government minimizes the Environmental
Impacts (EIs) subject to specific conditions on its net rev-
enue and power plant’s profit. According to the Kyoto
protocol in 1992, governments should take actions to
reduce pollution by raising the percentage of green elec-
tricity supply (Yoo and Kwak 2009). The total amount of
pollution generated by the power plants is an important
factor for the policy makers of any government. In the
second scenario of the developed model, it is assumed that
the government considers a value, UbEls, for the maximum
permissible level of total pollution generated by the power
plants. Thereby, the government maximizes its net revenue
owing to the upper bound of EIs and the lower bound on
utility of the power plant. The proposed model in the first
scenario can be expressed as:








NtgEðDgÞ þ NtngEðDngÞ LbGNR
EðPÞR;
tg; tng free in sign:
ð25Þ
It is noteworthy that there are N power plants in the
population and M types of the pollutants are considered
with different importance weights. In this nonlinear pro-
gramming problem, the objective function represents the
EIs for pollution of the power plants. According to the
green policy, the government would minimize the total
weighted pollutant. The first constraint assures that the
government net revenue (GNR) from the power plants does
not become smaller than LbGNR. The second constraint is
individual rational constraint (IR) for the expected payoff
of the power plants. Under this condition, the power plants
would like to accept government’s tariffs; otherwise, they
will reject the tariffs and withdraw from the electricity
market. In the other words, IR constraint guarantees that
the power plants would like to have a long-term relation-
ship with the government. The suggested model for the
second scenario can be expressed as:










tg; tng free in sign:
ð26Þ
In this optimization problem, the objective function
represents the GNR; hence, the government would maxi-
mize its net revenue from both the green and non-green
power plants. The first constraint assures that the envi-
ronmental impacts of the power generation activities do not
exceed the upper bound UbEls. The second constraint is IR
condition of the power plants. To obtain optimal policy of
the government, its models at the equilibrium prices should
be solved.
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In the models (25) and (26), all the object functions and
constraints are nonlinear functions in tg;g, tg;ng, tng;g and
tng;ng. Therefore, the problems (25)–(26) are nonlinear
programming problems which can be simply solved by a
nonlinear programming solver. We perform all the
numerical calculations by optimization toolbox of
MATLAB 14.
Numerical example
In this section, a numerical example is provided to
demonstrate how the theoretical results, in this paper,
can be applied in practice. It is supposed that there are a
population of 100 power plants in a competitive market.
All these power plants have the same market and
structural characteristics. For power generation, each
power plant has two options for the green or the non-
green energy sources. To analyze the sensitivity of the
model to characteristics of being green, the data of
numerical examples were presented in a way that the
advantage of green energy source over non-green energy
source was the environmental features. Moreover, the
market characteristics for the non-green energy source
were evaluated better than those of the green energy
source. Parameters in this numerical example are listed
in Tables 2 and 3.
It is assumed that LbGNR ¼ 10; 000; UbEls ¼
15; 000; R ¼ 1000. First, the government model will be
solved at the equilibrium price of the power plants to get
tariffs of the power plant. Then, the game will be analyzed
using the evolutionary game theory.
When 105  tg; tng  105, Fig. 1 illustrates the surface
of objective function (EIs) in the first scenario. From
Fig. 1, it can be understood that when the maximum level
of tax to the non-green energy source and the minimum
level of subsidies for the green energy source are applied,
EIs is minimal. On contrary, the EIs is maximal, when the
maximum level of tax to the green energy source and the
minimum level of subsidies for the non-green energy
source are applied.
Figure 2 shows the surface of objective function in the
second scenario. In comparison with tg [ tng, from Fig. 2,
it is obvious that the government has the most revenue
when tng [ tg. From Fig. 1, it is visible that in the first
scenario, subsidy will be applied for the green energy
source and the tax will be applied for the non-green energy
source. However, Fig. 2 illustrates that the government
imposes a rather high tax for the non-green energy source
to maximize the GNR in the second scenario. The calcu-
lated values for this example are summarized in Table 4.
The results of optimal, tariffs, electricity prices, profit
Table 2 Power plants data
Parameters Energy source Parameters Energy source
Green Non-green Green Non-green
C 10 13 g2 15 20
F 700 350 w1 0.5 0.6
g1 20 25 w2 0.6 0.7
Table 3 Data of demand function ðaij; bij; cijÞ
Power plant j
Power plant i Production strategy Green Non-green
Green (1400, 16, 17) (1300, 18, 15)
Non-green (1700, 14, 18) (1600, 15, 16)
Fig. 1 Surface of objective
function in first scenario (EIs)
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value of power plants, and objective function, in each
scenario, are given in the rows of this table.
From Proposition 4, it can be inferred that the Nash
equilibria that are evolutionary stable are found as
X1 ¼ ð1; 0Þ, X2 ¼ ð0; 1Þ. Figure 3 shows how the strategies
of the power plants converge to ESS (1, 0) or (0, 1). The
trajectory of ds/dt for x3 ¼ ð0:8998; 0:1002Þ and five dif-
ferent initial conditions have been shown in Fig. 4.
The example results shown in the second scenario,
x1 ¼ ð1; 0Þ, x2 ¼ ð0; 1Þ are symmetric Nash equilibria.
Both of these Nash equilibria are evolutionary stable,
because Pg;g Png;g ¼ 180[ 0 and Png;ng Pg;ng ¼
152760[ 0. Figure 5 indicates how the strategies of the
power plants converge to ESS (1, 0) or (0,1). The trajectory
of ds/dt for x1 ¼ ð1; 0Þ and four different initial conditions
have been shown in Fig. 6.
From Figs. 5 and 6, it is implied that under the gov-
ernment tariffs, X1 ¼ ð1; 0Þ is the ESS point of the game
and all the power plants will be driven to adopt the green
energy source in the long-term evolution. From the
numerical example, it is found that the tariffs imposed by
the government have important short-term and long-term
effects on the source selection decisions of the power
plants. Sensitivity analysis on the tariffs can determine the
short-term strategies of the power plants. Furthermore, they
can show how the strategies of the power plants evolve in
long term. Therefore, the results of the sensitivity analyses
can reveal appropriate decisions of the government with
respect to the budget limitations and environmental stan-
dard considerations.
Conclusions
This study is a contribution to the growing research on the
development of rigorous mathematical and game theory
frameworks for the environmental-energy modeling. In a
competitive electricity market, the proposed computational
framework helps the governmental policy makers to deter-
mine appropriate tariffs for each of the individual electric
power plants considering the energy source used by them. A
numerical example was presented to analyze the perfor-
mance of the model in different two scenarios of the model.
This numerical example also demonstrates how the policy
makers could determine the appropriate tariffs to achieve the
desired short-term and long-term environmental objectives.
There are several directions and suggestions for future
research. First of all, the proposed model can be extended
to the case where more than two energy sources exist with
different environmental effects. Secondly, in the present
study, the demand function for each power plant was
assumed in the linear form. However, other types of the
Table 4 Details of calculated
values and example results
Variable First scenario Second scenario Variable Second scenario First scenario
tg -22.283 391.64 Dng;g 1795.4 1365
tng 24.024 500 Dng;ng 2263.9 1753.9
pg;g 102.51 130.1 Pg;g 230,080 136,240
pg;ng 108.31 112.55 Pg;ng 188,580 173,250
png;g 110.5 141.24 Png;g 229,900 132,740
png;ng 129.93 163.93 Png;ng 341,340 204,730
Dg;g 1480.2 1921.6 GNR 1.6508e ? 08 *
Dg;ng 1769.5 1845.8 Els * 6,938,800
S 1 0.8998
Fig. 2 Surface of objective
function in second scenario
(GNR)
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demand function can be assumed for future research.
Moreover, it would be very interesting but challenging to
consider the uncertainty on other model parameters such as
electricity production costs or demand function of the
power plants. Eventually, application of the proposed
framework can be extended to some other markets.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://crea
tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1 The first-order conditions of profit
of power plants are
oPij=opij ¼ aij  2bijðpij  CiÞ þ cijðpji  CjÞ
þ cijðtj þ CjÞ  bijðti þ CiÞ ¼ 0;
ð27Þ
Now, let us define the following variables:
Mij ¼ pij  Ci; ð28Þ
Using Mij and Mji, we rewrite the first-order conditions
as:
2bijMij  cijMji ¼ aij þ cijðtj þ CjÞ  bijðti þ CiÞ; ð29Þ
2bjiMji  cjiMij ¼ aji þ cjiðti þ CiÞ  bjiðtj þ CjÞ; ð30Þ
Fig. 3 Convergence to ESS (1, 0) or (0, 1) in first scenario
Fig. 4 Trajectories of ds/dt in first scenario
Fig. 5 Convergence to ESS (1, 0) or (0, 1) in second scenario
Fig. 6 Trajectories of ds/dt in second scenario
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By solving (Eq. 31) and (Eq. 32) simultaneously, we
have
Mij ¼




The pij and p

ji obtained from Eq. (3) are the optimum
prices if the profit functions are concave on pij and pji. The
second derivative of the function is as follows:
o2Pij=ðopijÞ2 ¼ bij  bij ¼ 2bij  0; ð32Þ
It is known that bij is the positive value. Therefore, it is
obvious that the second derivative of the profit function in
the equilibrium is negative; hence, the function is concave
at this point. h
Proof of Proposition 2 By substituting Mij obtained from
Proposition 1 into Eqs. (1) and (2), after some mathemat-
ical manipulations, the demand and profit function can be
simplified into
Dij ¼ bijMij ¼ bijðhij þ sijtij þ vijtj Þ ð33Þ
Pij ¼ bijM
2
ij  Fi ¼ biðhij þ sijtij þ vijtj Þ2  Fi: ð34Þ
That hij; sij and vij are defined as Proposition 2. h
Proof of Proposition 3 The Eq. (17) is equal to.
dsðtÞ=sðtÞð1  sðtÞÞðða11  a21Þ:sðtÞ  ða22  a12Þ
:ð1  sðtÞÞÞ ¼ dt; ð35Þ
From (Barron 2013), it is known that the integration of
ds=sð1  sÞðas  bð1  sÞÞ ¼ dt is
ðas  bð1  sÞÞ1aþ1b=ð1  sÞ1as1b ¼ Cet; ð36Þ
Therefore, from (35) and (36) we can get (20). h
Proof of Lemma 1 The set of Nash equilibria in the game








And the set of Nash equilibria in the game with matrix
A ¼ a11  a a12  b





¼ sðtÞð1  sðtÞÞðða11  a þ a22  b  a12 þ b  a21 þ aÞ
:sðtÞ þ a12  b  a22 þ bÞ
¼ sðtÞð1  sðtÞÞðða11 þ a22  a12  a21Þ:sðtÞ þ a12  a22Þ:
ð38Þ
(37) and (38) show that these games have the same set of
Nash equilibria. h
Proof of Proposition 4 From the Lemma 1, for given any
two-player symmetric game with matrix A ¼ a11 a12
a21 a22
 
and B ¼ AT then the game is equivalent to the symmetric
game with matrix A ¼ a11  a a12  b
a21  a a22  b
 
and B ¼ AT.
The ESS conditions given in Definition 1 are not influenced
by this transformation (Webb 2007). In the power plant’s
payoff matrix (10), let a ¼ a21 and b ¼ a12, then we have
the equivalent matrix A ¼ a11  a21 0
0 a22  a12
 
.
Now, we evaluate the cases of Proposition 2.
Cases (21) and (23) In each case, there is a unique strict
symmetric Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the ESSs are
either ðs; 1  sÞ ¼ ð1; 0Þ (in Case 21) or ðs; 1  sÞ ¼ ð0; 1Þ
(in Case 23).
Case (24) In this case, X1 ¼ ðs; 1  sÞ ¼ ð1; 0Þ,
X2 ¼ ðs; 1  sÞ ¼ ð0; 1Þ, and X3 ¼ ðs; 1  sÞ are three
symmetric Nash equilibriums, where s is defined by
Eq. (18). The two pure Nash equilibriums X1, X2 are strict
and, therefore, are ESSs. In view of Definition 2.3.1, the
mixed Nash X3 is not an ESS, because condition
ðs; 1  sÞAðs; 1  sÞT ¼ ðs; 1  sÞAðs; 1  sÞT
¼ a11  a21
 
s; ð39Þ
is hold for each s 2 0; 1½  and
ðs; 1  sÞAð1; 0ÞT ¼ a11  a21
 
s\ð1; 0ÞAð1; 0ÞT
¼ a11  a21: ð40Þ
Therefore, X3 does not satisfy condition (7) of Definition
2.3.1.
Case (22) The symmetric Nash equilibrium X3 ¼ ðs; 1 
sÞ where s is defined by Eq. (18) is an ESS because
ðs; 1  sÞAðs; 1  sÞT ¼ ðs; 1  sÞAðs; 1  sÞT
¼ a11  a21
 
s: ð41Þ




ðs; 1  sÞAðs; 1  sÞT ¼ a11  a21
 
s[ ðs; 1  sÞAðs; 1  sÞT
¼ a11  a21
 
s2 þ a22  a12
 ð1  sÞ2;
ð42Þ
is hold for each s 2 0; 1½ . Thus, X satisfies the conditions
of Definition 2.3.1 and it is an ESS. h
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